How Safe Is Safe Enough?



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Americans still don't trust self-driving cars

Nearly 3 in 4 Americans say autonomous vehicle technology "is not ready for primetime"

By Andrew J. Hawkins | @andyjayhawk | May 19, 2020, 12:01am EDT



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Do you trust automated cars? If not, you're not alone



In Europe, trust in automated cars is still pretty low. In a 2019 Eurobarometer survey, half of the respondents said they would not use automated vehicles if given the opportunity. Only 2% said they would buy an automated vehicle right away. Image credit - Ian Maddox licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0

Is Supervised "Autopilot" Actually Safer?



Active safety seems to be dominant benefit, not "autopilot"



https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradtempleton/2 020/10/28/new-tesla-autopilot-statistics-showits-almost-as-safe-driving-with-it-as-without/

Chart of miles per "accident" with and without Tesla Autopilot, corrected for freeway vs. city ... [+] BRAD

TEMPLETON

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- Cognitive biases may lead to unrealistic safety requirements from selfdriving cars.
- Most people require higher levels of safety before agreeing to a ride with a self-driving car than a human driver.
- We tend to regard ourselves as safer drivers than we actually are.
- The safer drivers we regard ourselves as being, the more safety we demand from self-driving cars.

https://bit.ly/3gENLaX

Current Regulatory Strategy

- US Govt. regulates technology
 - State governments regulate/license drivers
 - Regulators have minimal software expertise
 - Vehicle makers self-certify
 - Reactive safety recalls & litigation
- EU starting to specifically regulate (e.g., ALKS) FMVSS 138 Telltale
 - Type approval based on testing
- Safety primarily via vehicle tests
 - US Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), NCAP
 - EU Type approval tests, Euro NCAP
 - Emphasizes functionality, not software safety





How Safe Is Safe Enough?

- 2019 NHTSA data (public roads)
 - 36,096 fatalities (1.10/100M miles)
 - 2,740,000 injuries
 - 6,756,000 police-reported crashes
 - Data includes drunk drivers, speeders, no seat belts
 - Unimpaired, law abiding drivers would have lower rates
- Non-occupant fatalities: 20% (pedestrians, bicycles, etc.)
 - Motorcyclist fatalities: 14%

→ Expect zero deaths in a 10 million mile road test campaign (On average, expect 0.1 fatalities, 0.02 pedestrian fatalities)

[DOT HS 813 060 & DOT HS 813 021]

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Which Driver Are We Better Than?

~100M miles/fatal mishap for human driven road vehicles

- 28% Alcohol impaired/Driving Under Influence
- 26% Speed-related
- 9% distracted driving
- 2% drowsy ...

(total > 100% due to multiple factors in some mishaps) [DOT HS 813 060 & DOT HS 813 021]

Unimpaired drivers operating at safe speed are much better than 100M miles per fatal mishap

70 Rate Drivers) 60 50 Fatality Involvement (Per 100,000 Licensed 40 30 20 10 00 Driver Age Group (yrs) https://goo.gl/tEuoaS

Fast reaction times do not necessarily ensure safety

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ODD Affects "Safe Enough" Value

Fatality averages for 2019 (IIHS)

- Location Deaths/100K people
- Jation

 DC
 3.3

 US
 11.0

 7.7x

 25.4

Deaths/100M miles A 0.51 US 1.11 3.4x

Fatal crash type

- DC: highest pedestrian rate (39%)
- NY, FL, DE: highest bicycle rate (5%)
- Fatalities per 100M miles: Urban 0.86 vs. Rural 1.65
- What about day/night, weather, vehicle safety features, etc.?

[IIHS Fatality Fact Sheets State by State; DOT HS 813 060]

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Approaches To Measuring "Safe"

- "Positive Risk Balance" > AVs kill fewer than human drivers
 - What about injuries? Property damage?
 - Adjusted for ODD vs. entire human fleet?
- What if fatalities have different victim profile?
 - Race/ethnicity (skin color, clothing, neighborhood)
 - Not a "typical" adult (children, impairments, agility)
 - Road use (pedestrians, cyclists, jaywalkers)
- Other possible considerations:
 - Expected cost (insurance) vs. as low as practicable (ALARP)
 - Adverse news events



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Standards-Based Engineering Approach

<section-header>US DOT: "This is exactly the way we wanted standards to be used" per be used" per be used" per be used to be used to be the used to the used to the used to be the used to the us</section-header>	SYSTEM SAFETY	UL 4600		Safety Beyond Dynamic Driving	HIGHLY AUTOMATED VEHICLE SAFETY CASE UL 4600
	DYNAMIC DRIVING FUNCTION	ISO 21448	SaFAD/ISO TR 4804	Environment & Edge Cases	
	FUNCTIONAL SAFETY	ISO 26262		Equipment Faults	
Good stuff! "for transparency. I'm on the standards development committee for UL 4600 with Phi Standards-Based Engineering Approach SYSTEM UL 4600 Bynamic Dynamic Dynamic	CYBER- SECURITY	SAE J3061	SAE 21434	Computer Security	
DYNAMIC PRIVETING BOPPAS 21448 SaFADISO TR 4804 Environment & Edge Cases FUNCTIONAL FUNCTIONAL SCRUTTY ISO 2020 Equipment Punctional SCRUTY CYBER- SCRUTTY SAE 2030 SAE 21434 Computer Computer With You AFETY PMVSS NCAP Basic White White States With You AFETY FMVSS NCAP Basic White States Mttps://bit.ly/3dV2LA5	VEHICLE SAFETY	FMVSS	NCAP	Basic Vehicle Functions	

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Changing Safety Expectations, Standards & Regulation

"Safe as a human driver" is complicated

- Expectations beyond simple Positive Risk Balance
- Increasing regulatory pressure to follow standards

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