

Coherence of technology and regulation: The case of electricity

Professor Marija Ilic

ECE and EPP Departments

Carnegie Mellon University

milic@ece.cmu.edu

University of Paris Workshop on the NGI Project

May 29, 2006

Talk outline

- Brief summary of the electric system infrastructure evolution
- **Demand characterization** as the key to architecture choice and its evolution
- The need for systemic technological and regulatory approach in the electricity sector
- Examples of several layer schemas and their technological, regulatory and economic characterization
- Layer schema as a complex dynamic system
- Hidden opportunism
- Dynamic Energy Control Protocols (DECP) as a means of managing opportunism

Brief summary of the electric system infrastructure evolution

- Historically, neither regulated nor liberalized electricity system was designed at one stage with well-defined/understood objectives.
- **Technologically**, the system has evolved in a mushroom-type manner driven by the **load demand needs**.
- **Institutionally**, governance has evolved to accommodate the **load demand needs** as well (private or publicly owned utilities governed by the local states).
- As a rule, there has not been much coordination of technological and institutional solutions (“designs”).
- **N.B. NO “DESIGNS” OF LAYER SCHEMA; GRADUAL EVOLUTION, INSTEAD.**

Demand characterization as the key to architecture choice and its evolution

- Two qualitatively different demand characterizations/roles and their hybrids.
- **Demand characterization I--top-down:** Demand is projected by the utilities (using macro-economic signals, temperature, climate); any deviations of total demand are managed as hard-to-predict disturbances.
- **Demand characterization II--bottom-up:** Demand is characterized by the individual loads (actors), including both expectations and bounds on deviations.
- **Hybrid demand characterizations--**various degrees of multi-layered aggregation of the individual actors interacting with the utilities.

Needs for coherence of technology and regulation in the electricity sector

- What it is and what it might be
 - The challenge of managing change (invalid technological and regulatory assumptions and complexities, and their relations)
 - The evolving architectures over longer-time horizons (examples of traditional and evolving system goals)
 - Relationships between goals and qualitative (and quantifiable) system characteristics
 - Possible architectures (schema) for internalizing externalities (multi-layered architectures) (CMU research)

MAJOR QUESTION: HOW TO CATALYZE THE CHANGE (BY MEANS OF TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATION DESIGNS) ACCORDING TO WELL-UNDERSTOOD OBJECTIVES ?

An example of what it is and what it might be: The case of electric power grids

- **What it is** (August 2003)

Grid failure caused by **lack of info/incentives** to the individual actors for on-line adjustments prior to becoming too late

What it might be: On-line adjustments at the **system demand side (individual actors)**, and by the system operators to re-route remaining resources w/o losing the system as a whole

STRIKING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TOP DOWN AND DISTRIBUTED/MULTI-LAYERED APPROACHES (TECHNOLOGICAL AND REGULATORY)


The challenge of managing change

- Network infrastructures have largely been designed assuming **system characteristics that no longer hold** [1,2]
- **Qualitatively new system characteristics and objectives evolving** as a result of regulatory changes, technological progress and unplanned component failures [3]
- **No methodologies** to manage this evolution

Examples of several layer schemas and their technological, regulatory and economic characterization[5,6,7,8]

- 1. **Existing paradigm**: Centralized, large scale; vertically integrated, horizontally distributed.
- 2. **Transitional paradigm**: Aggregation across non-traditional boundaries
- **Likely end state paradigm** : Very decentralized, large number of small scale individual actors (demand side, in particular).

Vertically integrated and hybrid layer schema



Key Features under Regulation

- Operations and planning separate tasks
- Hierarchical operations and control based on temporal and spatial separation
- Generation and transmission planning done sequentially and statically
- Average price reflecting total capital and O&M (not an actively used signal)
- Customer not an active decision maker
- No direct incentive for right technologies

Traditional objective—regulatory benchmark [4]

$$\begin{aligned}
 \min_{P_{i,a}^G, I_{i,a}^G, I_l^T} & \sum_{i,a} \int_{t_0}^T e^{-rt} \left[c_{i,a} \left(P_{i,a}(t) \right) + C_{i,a}^G \left(K_{i,a}^G(t), I_{i,a}^G(t), t \right) \right] dt \\
 & + \sum_l \int_{t_0}^T e^{-rt} \left[C_l^T \left(K_l^T(t), I_l^T(t), t \right) \right] dt \\
 & - \sum_i \int_{t_0}^T e^{-rt} \left[U_i \left(L_i(t), u_i(t) \right) \right] dt
 \end{aligned}$$

Technology

Investment

Uncertainty in Load

subject to


$$\frac{dK_l^T}{dt} = I_l^T(t) ; \frac{dK_{i,a}^G}{dt} = I_{i,a}^G(t) ; K_l^T(0), K_{i,a}^G(0) ; I_l^T(t), I_{i,a}^G(t) \geq 0$$

$$\sum_i H_{li} \left(P_{i,a}(t) - L_i(t) \right) \leq K_l^T, P_{i,a}(t) \leq K_{i,a}^G, \sum_{i,a} P_{i,a} = \sum_i L_i$$

Evolving architectures—(partially) distributed

- Customers beginning to respond to the market forces (considering alternatives--user syndicates, customer choice, DG, etc)
- DGs forming portfolios (syndicates)
- Distribution companies (wire owners) designing for synergies, MINIGRIDS
- Manufactures providing equipment /design
- **An overall problem: Signals for change weak**

Decentralized Paradigm— Individual actors'-driven schema



Decision making by the individual actors


- Electricity Supply from System Side

$$\min_{P_{i,a}^G, I_{i,a}^G} \int_{t_0}^T \left[c_{i,a}(t) P_{i,a}(t) + C_{i,a}^G(K_{i,a}^G(t), I_{i,a}^G(t), t) - \lambda(t) P_{i,a}(t) + \sum_l \mu_l(t) H_{li} P_{i,a}(t) \right] dt$$

Energy Market Price




Transmission Market Price




subject to

$$\frac{dK_{i,a}^G}{dt} = I_{i,a}^G(t) , I_{i,a}^G(t) \geq 0 , P_{i,a}(t) \leq K_{i,a}^G$$

A Long-term Electricity Price Model – HIDDEN OPPORTUNISM




Re-aggregation— multi-layered schema




Ongoing Changes

- Technological (cost-effective small and smart power supply, direct line flow control devices (FACTS), Internet, customer automation)
- Organizational (competitive power generation, electricity markets, customer choice, potential for PBR-based transmission businesses; open access)

Regional Electric Markets



Functional/Corporate Unbundling of Regulated Utilities—From traditional to individual actors-driven layer schemas



Key Features Under Competition

- Power supply, delivery and consumption separate functional and/or corporate entities (own objectives)
- Decentralized decision making under uncertainties
- Active use of price signals (temporal and spatial)
- Potential for valuing right technologies
- Issues with reliability and long term system evolution

Individual actors-driven decisions

- Qualitatively Different Mode
 - Multi-stage, Decentralized Decisions
- Smart Components and Smart Control
 - Supplier
 - User
 - Transmission
- Role of Information Technology (IT)

Non-traditional objectives in the evolving architectures for critical infrastructures

[5,8,9] – “ilities”

- Differentiated reliable service at value
- Sustainable mid-/long-term system evolution
- Flexible response to rare events
- **HIDDEN OPPORTUNISM**

Optimality as a function of layer schema


- **Paradigm 1—Vertically integrated layer schema** : Despite the popular belief, not optimal long-term under uncertainties (much more remains to be done if dynamic social welfare is to be optimized in a coordinated way)
- **Paradigm 2—Individual actors-driven layer schema**: Performance very sensitive to the smartness of switches and aggregation
- **Paradigm 3—Multi-layered schema**: Feasible, near optimal under uncertainties; switching to implement differential reliability

Layer schema as a complex dynamic system


- The need for engineering systems thinking in man-made infrastructures: **Complexities**
- **Heterogeneous signals defining system architecture** (physical network driven by economic, regulatory and technical actions); **evolving architectures**
- Wide range of **spatial and temporal inter-dependencies**
- **Architecture-dependent objectives and uncertainties**
- Fundamental **irrelevance of root-causes** [1]
- Fundamental **need for completeness** [3]
- Fundamental need for **embedded on-line information monitoring and use for decision making** [2]

Inter-temporal dependencies


- Typical demand profile
- Need to balance power instantaneously
- Could be supplied either on the spot, or through long-term contracts
- Depending on how are uncertainties managed, very different effects on system-wide performance (in particular on “ilities”)
- **RESULTS VERY DIFFERENT DEPENDING ON HOW IS SYSTEM MANAGED UNDER TOPOLOGICAL CHANGES (HIDDEN OPPORTUNISM)**



Engineering time-line: Relevance of long-term for architecture evolution






Market and Physical Inter-temporal Complexities







Spatial complexities


- Very large networks
- Often no direct control of power flows between the sub-networks
- Regulatory requirements for “open access”
- Various levels of granularity: Nodes, zones, administrative boundaries (utilities, control areas)
(HIDDEN OPPORTUNISM)
- Without aggregation it is impossible to “learn” how to use the network in a bottom-up way (too combinatorial)











Dynamic aggregation

- Zones—sub-groups of end-users which contribute to the line flow constraint of interest the same way (Zone 1—the largest effect; Zone 2-smaller effect, ..)
- Could be used for spatial simplifications; extremely relevant for architecture transparency and market liquidity;
- Open questions: **Coordination** of zones and/or control areas to implement “open access” delivery [3] **(HIDDEN OPPORTUNISM)**

Multi-layered architectures for flexible and reliable operation over the wide range of system conditions

- Multi-directional signals replacing top-down info flows (**a means of internalizing externalities**)
- Embedded modeling and dynamic decision making tools for defining multi-directional info flows (translating complex inter-temporal dependencies into useful, transparent info; Managing spatial complexities through dynamic data compression into useful info for various layers)
- The paper [9] provides theoretical foundations for this as well as a conceptual rationale for going beyond static top-down approach

Catalyzing architecture evolution— technological progress

- Computer tools for making complex data into useful info w/o losing the essential information (spatial and temporal) for the effective decision making
- Providing info dynamically at various industry layers (examples of this in the paper)
- **NEED REGULATORY INCENTIVES TO SUPPORT THIS (DYNAMIC ZONE OVER TIME AND SPACE??)**

Qualitatively Different Mode

- Suboptimal operation in static sense
- Potentially optimal long-term, given uncertainties (result of distributed stochastic optimization); multi-stage decision making
- System operating closer to the acceptable operating limits for which it was designed
- Conjecture: **IT tools** will play critical role in facilitating iterative interplay among different entities

Some conjectures [9]

- Efficient reliability and flexibility hard to implement in a centralized architecture given today' systems engineering knowledge
- If designed right, technical, economic and regulatory signals embedded within a network infrastructure play interchangeable role in inducing desired “ilities”
- Only under strong simplifying system characteristics various architectures lead to the same performance
- Significant differences in managing uncertainties and nonlinearities (non-unique outcomes managed within a multi-layered architecture)-”ilities”
- Multi-directional flows essential for internalizing externalities

Architecture characteristics and relations to goals

- The three industry structures result in the same total system cost at equilibrium (theoretical and simulations-results) given perfect info
- Critical assumptions: Linear (DC) relations between power injections and flows; linear inequality constraints (LP problem)
- Non-linear load flow constraints do NOT lend themselves to the same result (voltage constraints cannot be handled) (NLP problem)
- Topological changes (reliability) cannot be included (DP problem)
- Common assumptions suffice traditional objectives; one must be much more careful with “ilities”

Critical open problems


- Design of **complete architectures** (including markets) for managing service at value (including physical reliability-related risks) over a wide range of time horizons and their inter-temporal dependencies;
- The **effect of decentralization** (coordination needed for system-wide efficiency; could be through price incentives, and/or engineering rules) [3]
- Tools for **re-bundling over time and space** to facilitate transparent complete architectures
- **Education challenges**: Defining infrastructures as heterogeneous large-scale dynamic systems; re-visiting state of art large-scale systems (CMU course 18-777); aggressive development of useful computer tools [10]

The key obstacles to having a coherent approach in the electricity sector

- Institutional (coexistence of obligation to serve and competitive power purchasing);
- Gap between cost-based delivery and value-based generation provision; rule-based system operations and planning
- Highly inflexible regulatory mechanisms for extracting the value of distributed “disruptive” technologies
- **WE PLAN TO PROVIDE SIMULATIONS SHOWING OUTCOMES UNDER VARIOUS REGULATORY LAYER SCHEMA; TOWARD DESIGNING DECPs**


Proposed enhancements-Toward Dynamic Energy Control Protocols (DECPS)

- **Demand must bid (short-, mid- and long-term)**
- **A sequential market for forward markets to meet long-term demand specifications**
- **Corresponding sequential market for managing network delivery and its valuation**
- **Natural link between operations and investments (currently broken)**
- **A Stratum Energy Market (SEM) design could build on the existing market design with careful assessment of the key enhancements [11]**




Dynamic Protocol --- Distributor Level

KEY ROLE




Dynamic Protocol --- Utility Level



Dynamic Protocol --- Customer Level

- Projected
- Spot Price



IT-supported Markets

- **Modeling layers at all levels of the evolving industry**
- **Modeling and learning interactions among the layers**
- **THE KEY QUESTION: WHO IS DESIGNING THESE AND ACCORDING TO WHICH THEORETICAL/PRAGMATIC APPROACHES?? AS OF NOW, IT IS LEARNING BY DOING.**

Relevant references

- [1]-[3] Three papers by Ilic at Charles River Research, Inc. www site, 2003/2004.
- [4] Yu, CN, Leotard, J-P, Ilic, M., "Dynamic Transmission Provision in Competitive Electric Power Industry", Discrete Event Dynamic Systems: Theory and Applications, 9, 351-388, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, MA.
- [5] Jelinek, M., Ilic, M., "A Strategic Framework for Electric Energy: Technology and Institutional Factors and IT in a Deregulated Environment", Proceedings of the NSF/DOE/EPRI sponsored Workshop on Research Needs in Complex Interactive Networks, Arlington, VA, December 2000, www NSF/ENG/ECS.
- [6] Ilic, M., "Change of Paradigms in Complexity and Interdependencies of Infrastructures: The Case for Flexible New Protocols", Proceedings of the OSTP/NSF White House Meeting, June 2001.
- [7] Ilic, M., "Model-based Protocols for the Changing Electric Power Industry", Proceedings of the Power Systems Computation Conference, June 24-28, 2002, Seville, Spain.
- [8] Ilic, M. A Control Engineering Approach to Reliable and Flexible Infrastructure Systems, Proceedings of the MIT Internal Symposium, 2002.
- [9] Ilic, M., Toward a Multi-Layered Architecture of Large-Scale Complex Systems: The Problem of Reliable and Efficient Man-Made Infrastructures, Proceedings of the MIT ESD Symposium, 2004.
- [10] Ilic, M., Apt, J., Khosla, P., Lave, L., Morgan, G., Talukdar, S., "Introducing Electric Power into a Multi-Disciplinary Curriculum for Network Industries, IEEE Tran. On Power Systems, Special Issue on Education, February 2004.
- [11] Wu, R., Ilic, M., NAPS'06.