

# Image Biometric Verification in Spatial Frequency Domain

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# Acknowledgments

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
# Outline

- Motivation for Biometrics
- Use of spatial frequency domain --- Correlation filters
- Face recognition including face recognition grand challenge (FRGC)
- Iris recognition including iris challenge evaluation (ICE)
- Fingerprint verification
- Palmprint verification
- Cancelable biometric templates
- Conclusions

# Motivation

- Recognizing the identity of a person can improve security of access to physical and virtual spaces
- Most current methods rely on passwords (“**what you know**”), ID cards (“**what you have**”) that can be easily forgotten or stolen
- Identity recognition based on biometrics (e.g., Fingerprints, face, iris, etc.) focuses on “**what you are**”
- **Biometrics**: measurable, physical characteristics or behavioral traits used to identify or verify a person

# Biometric Types



Courtesy: Prof. Arun Ross

# Biometric Applications



Hajj pilgrims in Saudi Arabia



\* Type ID  
 \* Swipe ID  
 \* Select payment  
 -OR-  
 \* Pay cashier  
 Cred | Debit | EBT |

Fingerprint at check-out counter



Disney World



Ben Gurion Airport



Cell Phone with Fingerprint Sensor



Smart gun

# Terminology

- **Verification** (1:1 matching)
  - ▼ Am I who I say I am?
  - ▼ Example application: Trusted Traveler Card, ATM smart card
- **Identification** (1:N matching)
  - ▼ Does this face match to one of those in a database?
  - ▼ Example application: Looking for suspects in crowds
- **Recognition** = Verification + Identification

# Challenge: Pattern Variability



- **Challenge:** To tolerate pattern variability (some times called distortions) while maintaining discrimination
- Facial appearance change due to illumination
- Fingerprint image change due to plastic deformation






# Eigenfaces

- Each  $d \times d$  image represented as a point in a  $d^2$ -dimensional space
- Performs principal component analysis (PCA) on training faces to build a subspace. PCA finds principal directions of variance in training data by diagonalizing the covariance matrix.



Ref: M. Turk and A. Pentland, "Eigenfaces for recognition," *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 3(1):71–86, 1991




# Eigenfaces



- Eigenfaces is an image-domain technique; other image-domain techniques exist
- The 2-D Fourier transform is an information-preserving operation
- Spatial frequency-domain approaches (also called **correlation filters**) work very well for automatic target recognition (ATR); can biometrics benefit by operating in spatial frequency domain?


$$F(u, v) = \iint f(x, y) e^{-j2\pi(ux+vy)} dx dy$$

# Correlation Filters



# Peak to Sidelobe Ratio (PSR)


- PSR invariant to constant illumination changes




$$PSR = \frac{Peak - mean}{\sigma}$$

- Match declared when PSR is large, i.e., peak must not only be large, but sidelobes must be small.


# CMU PIE Database



Ref: T. Sim, S. Baker, and M. Bsat, "The CMU pose, illumination, and expression (PIE) database," *Proc. of the 5th IEEE Intl. Conf. on Automatic Face and Gesture Recognition*, May 2002.




**PIE Database, one face under 21 illuminations  
65 subjects**





**Train on 3, 7, 16, -> Test on 10.**

**Match Quality = 40.95**



# Occlusion of Eyes



Using the same filter as before,  
Match Quality = 30.60






# Uncentered Images


Match Quality = 22.38





# Impostor

Using someone else's filter  
**PSR = 4.77**



# Features of Correlation Filters

- Shift-invariant; no need for centering the test image
- Graceful degradation
- Can handle multiple appearances of the reference image in the test image
- Closed-form solutions based on well-defined metrics

Ref: B.V.K. Vijaya Kumar, A. Mahalanobis and Richard D. Juday, *Correlation Pattern Recognition*, Cambridge University Press, UK, November 2005.

## 49 Faces from PIE Database with illumination variations



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# Training Images


- **Three** face images (dark left half face, normal face illumination, dark right half face) used to synthesize a correlation filter and an individual eigenspace to perform verification



**n = 3**




**n = 7**



**n = 16**


# Equal Error Rate using Individual Eigenfaces

Equal Error Rate using Individual Eigenface Subspace Method on PIE Database with Background Illumination



**Average Equal Error  
Rate = 19.8 %**

# Peak-to-Sidelobe Ratio using Correlation Filter



# Face Recognition Grand Challenge (FRGC)

- To facilitate the advancement of face recognition research, FRGC has been organized by NIST




Single Still




Multiple Stills



Outdoor/  
Uncontrolled



3D Single  
view



3D Full Face

- Ver 2.0

▼ 625 Subjects; 50,000 Recordings; 70 Gbytes

\* P. J. Phillips, P. J. Flynn, T. Scruggs, K. W. Bowyer, J. Chang, K. Hoffman, J. Marques, J. Min, and W. Worek, "Overview of the Face Recognition Grand Challenge," *In Proceedings of IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, 2005



# FRGC Dataset: Experiment 4

Generic Training Set consisting of 222 people with a total of 12,776 images

Feature extraction




Feature space generation

Reduced Dimensional Feature Space


Reduced Dimensionality Feature Representation of Gallery Set  
16,028

Reduced Dimensionality Feature Representation of Probe Set  
8,014

project



project



Similarity Matching



Gallery Set of 466 people  
(16,028) images total

Probe Set of 466 people  
(8,014) images total

# FRGC "Gallery" Images



Controlled (Indoor)

16,028 gallery images of 466 people

# FRGC "Probe" Images



Uncontrolled (Indoor)


# FRGC “Probe” Images



Uncontrolled (Outdoor)

Outdoor illumination images are very challenging due to harsh cast shadows


# FRGC Baseline Results



The verification rate of PCA is about 12% at **False Accept Rate 0.1%**.


## FRGC Expt. 4 Performance

- Eigenfaces (Baseline) results provided by FRGC team
- Performance measured at 0.1 % FAR (False Acceptance Rate)



# Iris Biometric


**Pattern source:** muscle ligaments (sphincter, dilator), and connective tissue



## Biometric Advantages

- Extremely unique pattern.
- Remains stable over an individual's lifetime.

# Iris Verification



Source: National Geographic Magazine




# Iris Recognition System in UAE

- “Largest national deployment so far of iris recognition ... now in its third year of operation.”
- 17 air, land, sea ports; 6500 people/day
- Database of 420,000 iris codes of expellees
- Report zero false matches; 0.2% false rejections
- Daugman, International Airport Review (2) 2004




# Iris Segmentation

**Standard iris segmentation:** commonly used, proposed by Daugman<sup>1</sup>



<sup>1</sup> J.G. Daugman, "High Confidence Visual Recognition of Persons by a Test of Statistical Independence," *IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence*, vol. 15, no. 11, pp. 1148-61, Nov. 1993.

# Daugman's Iris Code Method



*Circular Edge Detector    Gabor Wavelet Analysis    2048 bits iris code*

## ■ 2D Gabor Wavelet Transform

$$\iint_{r,\theta} G(r,\theta) I(r,\theta) r dr d\theta$$

$$G(r,\theta) = e^{-i\omega(\theta-\theta_0)} e^{-(r-r_0)^2/\alpha^2} e^{-(\theta-\theta_0)^2/\beta^2}$$

- 5 parameters in Gabor function  $\alpha, \beta, \omega, \theta_0$  and  $r_0$
- Hamming distance between iris codes used to decide authentic/impostor


Ref: J. G. Daugman, "High confidence visual recognition of persons by a test of statistical independence,"  
*IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Machine Intell.*, Vol.15, pp. 1148-1161, 1993.

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# Iris Recognition: Correlation Filters

We use correlation filters for iris recognition. We design a filter for each iris class using a set of training images.

## Determining an iris match with a correlation filter





## Define Experiments

Exp 1

Right Eye



1425 Iris Images  
124 Individuals

Exp 2

Left Eye




1528 Iris Images  
120 Individuals

112 Overlapping Individuals  
132 Total Individuals

Source: Jonathon P. Phillips, NIST

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## Bar Plot Performance Results Fully Automatic, FAR=0.001





Results from Open Book Challenge Problem  
NOT Independent Evaluation

Source: Jonathon P. Phillips, NIST

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# Iris On the Move (IOM)



# Fingerprint Recognition


- 1880 – Fingerprint identification in India by Herschel
- Fingerprint identification used in law enforcement
  - ▼ Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) FBI Standards
    - ▼ Minimum resolution of 500 dpi (inked as well as live scan)
    - ▼ Some companies: Bioscrypt, Sagem, etc.
- Current interest – digital live-scan devices
  - ▼ Sensors - optical, capacitive, electric-field, thermal, ultrasound
- Access control applications
  - ▼ cell phone, PDA, computer, bank ATM, buildings,...






# Minutiae Extraction

- Minutiae – ridge endings/bifurcations
- Minutiae extraction
  - ▼ Orientation field estimation
  - ▼ Ridge extraction
  - ▼ Thinning
  - ▼ Minutiae extraction



Minutiae




Ref: A. Jain, L. Hong, R. Bolle, "On-Line Fingerprint Verification," *IEEE Transactions on PAMI*, Vol. 19, pp. 302–314, 1997.


# Minutiae matching

## ■ Minutiae Matching


- ▼ Find a reference minutiae pair
- ▼ Alignment of template and test sets
- ▼ Minutiae matching by searching around an elastic bounding box



Template Set




Test Set



Alignment

Minutiae Matching



Ref: D. Maltoni, D. Maio, A.K. Jain and S. Prabhakar, *Handbook of Fingerprint Recognition*, Springer Verlag, New York, 2003.

# NIST 24 Database

- Digital Video of Live-scan Fingerprint Data
- Optical sensor DFR-90 from Identicator technology of 500 dpi resolution
- Chosen data set - plastic distortion set
  - ▼ The finger is rolled and twisted
- 10 fingers of 10 people ( 5 female and 5 male )
- 10 secs of MPEG2 movie per finger
  - ▼ 300 images of size 448x478 pixels (padded to 512x512 pixels)
- Chosen subset - 10 thumb prints




Class 3



Class 10

# Evaluation Protocol


- Training - uniformly sampled images from the 300 images of a class
- Test - correlate filters of each class against 300 images of all classes
  - ▼ Images of the same class as the filter – 300 authenticics per filter
  - ▼ Images of a different class from the filter – 2700 impostors per filter



# Resolution Effect




512x512



256x256



128x128



64x64




32x32

0.6%




# Palmprints

- **Palmprints have a conglomerate of features.**
- **These include principal lines, smaller creases or wrinkles, fingerprint-like ridges and textures.**
- **Palmprints can be easily aligned about fiducial points of the hand's geometry or shape.**




# Palmpoint Verification

Training Images



# Experiment Specifications

- *PolyU* Palmprint Database
- 100 palms (classes)
- Left hands flipped to look as right hands
- 3 images per class for training
- 3 images per class for testing
- 5 different experiments using region sizes with sides of 64, 80, 96, 112, and 128 pixels





# Palmprint Verification Results

RESULTS OF OTSDF FILTER CLASSIFIER USING 100 CLASSES.

$n$	Avg FRRz ( $M_1$ )	Avg FARz ( $M_2$ )
64	2.6% (8)	0.07% (23)
80	1.0% (3)	0.02% (6)
96	0.3% (1)	0.01% (3)
112	1.0% (3)	0.01% (3)
128	0.3% (1)	0.03% (10)


*Avg FRRz*: Average FRR at zero FAR.  $M_1$  misses out of 300.

*Avg FARz*: Average FAR at zero FRR.  $M_2$  misses out of 29,700.


# Cancellable Biometric Filters

- A biometric filter (stored on a card) can be lost or stolen
  - ▼ Can we reissue a different one (just as we reissue a different credit card)?
  - ▼ There are only a limited set of biometric images per person (e.g., only one face)
  - ▼ We have to figure out a way to encrypt them and ‘work’ or authenticate in the encrypted domain and NOT directly in the original biometric domain.

# Enrollment Stage




# Authentication Stage




# Example of Encrypted Images


## Authentic Person




## Impostor Person




# Correlation from an Authentic using Kernel 1



# Correlation without Encryption




# Correlation from an Impostor





# Output from an Authentic using a Cancelled Kernel



# Summary

- **Correlation filters**
  - ▼ Achieved excellent performance in face recognition grand challenge (FRGC)
  - ▼ Performed very well in iris challenge evaluation (ICE)
  - ▼ Also successful in fingerprint recognition and palmprint recognition
- **All biometric modalities have their own strengths & weaknesses, suggesting that we may have to use multiple modalities in fielded systems**
- **Correlation filters provide a single matching engine for a variety of image biometrics --- making multi-biometric approaches feasible.**