Low-overhead Byzantine
Fault-tolerant Storage
Tuesday October 9, 2007
Hamerschlag Hall D-210
4:30 pm
James Hendricks
Carnegie Mellon University
This talk presents an erasure-coded Byzantine fault-tolerant block storage protocol that is
nearly as efficient as protocols that tolerate only crashes.
Previous Byzantine fault-tolerant block storage protocols have either relied upon
replication, which is inefficient for large blocks of data when tolerating multiple faults,
or a combination of additional servers, extra computation, and versioned storage.
To avoid these expensive techniques, our protocol employs novel mechanisms to optimize for
the common case when faults and concurrency are rare.
In the common case, a write operation completes in two rounds of communication and a read
completes in one round.
The protocol requires a short checksum comprised of cryptographic hashes and homomorphic
fingerprints.
It achieves throughput within 10% of the crash-tolerant protocol for writes and reads in
failure-free runs when configured to tolerate up to 6 faulty servers and any number of
faulty clients.
James Hendricks is a PhD student advised by Greg Ganger in the Computer Science Department
at Carnegie Mellon.
He is interested in the applied aspects of computer science, especially storage systems,
fault tolerance, security, and network systems.
James graduated PBK and TBP in EECS from Berkeley, and has worked at IBM Almaden, Cisco,
and Los Alamos National Laboratory.
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