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In this paper, we have presented an extension to our TESLA scheme which provides
a solution to the source authentication problem under the assumption that the
sender and receiver are loosely time synchronized. The basic TESLA protocol has
the following salient properties:
- Low computation overhead. On the order of one MAC function computation per
packet for both sender and receiver.
- Low communication overhead. Required is as little as one MAC value per
packet. Periodically, the sender also needs to send out the secret keys.
- Perfect loss robustness. If a packet arrives in time, the receiver can
verify its authenticity eventually (as long as it receives later packets).
The extensions we propose in this paper feature:
- The basic TESLA scheme provides delayed authentication. With additional
information in a packet, we show in this paper how we can provide immediate
authentication.
- We reduce the communication overhead when multiple TESLA instances with
different authentication delays are used concurrently.
- We derive a tight lower bound on the disclosure delay.
- Harden the sender and the receiver against denial-of-service attacks.
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Adrian Perrig
Sun Nov 5 19:29:44 PST 2000