Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks: Characterizations & Countermeasures

ECE Seminar: Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks: Characterizations & Countermeasures


Starts at: November 15, 2012 4:30 PM

Ends at: 5:30 PM

Location: Scaife Hall Auditorium

Speaker: Eilyan Bitar

Affiliation: Cornell

Link to Abstract

Details:

Faculty and Students,

If you would like to meet with Prof. Bitar during his visit to CMU on Thursday, Nov. 15th please email Claire Bauerle cbauerle@ece.cmu.edu cbauerle@ece.cmu.edu.

Seminar details: - Thurs. Nov. 15th , 4:30-5:30pm EST, Pittsburgh Campus: Scaife Auditorium (Room 125), Refreshments at 4pm. - Silicon Valley campus: Rm 118, Building 23 at 1:30 PST

Speaker: Eilyan Bitar, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Cornell University

Title: Smart Grid Data Integrity Attacks: Characterizations & Countermeasures

Abstract:

Real power injections at loads and generators, and real power flows on selected lines in a transmission network are monitored and transmitted over a SCADA network to the system operator. These are used in state estimation algorithms to make dispatch, re-balance and other energy management system [EMS] decisions. Coordinated cyberattacks of power meter reading scan be arranged to be undetectable by any bad data detection algorithm. These unobservable attacks present a serious threat to grid operations. Of particular interest are sparse attacks that involve the compromise of a modest number of meter readings.

An efficient algorithm to find all unobservable attacks [under standard DC load flow approximations] involving the compromise of exactly two power injection meters and an arbitrary number of power meters on lines is presented. This requires O(n^2m) flops for a power system with n buses and m line meters. If all lines are metered, there exist canonical forms that characterize all 3, 4, and 5-sparse unobservable attacks. These can be quickly detected with O(n^2) flops using standard graph algorithms. Known-secure phase measurement units [PMUs] can be used as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. Finding the minimum number of necessary PMUs is NP-hard. It is shown that p+1 PMUs at carefully chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize a collection of p cyberattacks.

Bio:

Eilyan Bitar is currently an Assistant Professor in the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Cornell University. Prior to joining Cornell in the Fall 2012, he was engaged as a Postdoctoral Fellow in the department of Computing + Mathematical Science (CMS) at the California Institute of Technology [hosted by Steven Low] and at the University of California, Berkeley in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science [hosted by Kameshwar Poolla] during the 2011-12 academic year. A native Californian, He received both his Ph.D. [2011] and B.S. [2006] from the University of California, Berkeley. His current research interests include stochastic optimization and control and their applications to the economics, operation, and protection of the electricity grid with large-scale penetration of variable renewable energy resources.