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# Vulnerabilities in MLC NAND Flash Memory Programming: Experimental Analysis, Exploits, and Mitigation Techniques

Carnegie Mellon University
SEAGATE
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SAFARI

**HPCA Session 3A – Monday, 3:15 PM, Salon F**


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


As the cells become smaller, they ***interfere*** with each other during **programming**…

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


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


…to reduce interference, today's MLC NAND flash chips use ***two-step programming***

Using **real MLC NAND flash chips**,
we show that two-step programming introduces
**new reliability and security vulnerabilities**

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We find that **cells with only one bit programmed** are **more vulnerable** to **interference during reads and writes** than fully-programmed cells



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





Vulnerabilities can be **exploited** to corrupt data and **reduce flash lifetime**

We propose **three solutions**
to minimize vulnerabilities at **negligible latency overhead**

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*No increase in flash latency, errors not completely eliminated*

***Increases flash lifetime by 16%***



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


## Want more? Come to our talk! Read our paper!

*Authors:* Yu Cai, **Saugata Ghose**, Yixin Luo, Ken Mai, Onur Mutlu, Erich F. Haratsch